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Writing  Constitutional  History  beyond the 
Institutional/Ideological  Divide 
CHRISTINE  A.  DESAN 
History is a strange medium: it carries the most contemporary  debates onto 
the most distant terrain. Both Bruce Mann and David Konig focus on the 
notions of change and context that undergird the forum essays. Those is- 
sues, more than any moment in early New York, link the articles and the 
comments. By exploring the way we defined "constitutions,"  "constitution- 
alism," and "constitutional  history,"  the commentators open up a large and 
current  question. They invite a discussion about approaches  to constitution- 
al change. 
The constitutional project that I would distinguish is the effort, proposed 
and conducted across generations, to construct a justified community from 
the accident of people who come together at a particular time and place. 
Families,  firms, schools,  and neighborhoods,  among other entities,  are 
constantly under constitutional construction. I focus here on the making 
of official government in order to distinguish one such project. Nothing 
limits the process, indeed much of the vocabulary of constitutional creation 
and change, to that conventional example. In each case, a constitutional 
project is the attempt made by many over time to coordinate human inter- 
actions by creating and legitimating a collective  and an individual. 
From the moment they define their association, those aiming at a con- 
stitutional  order  draw the categories that  divide the world so controversially. 
There are the people inside and the people outside, those public and those 
private, the group and the individual. The constitutional drama  begins from 
these lines, the effort to locate them in fact, and the unsettling existence 
of alternatives. So contemporaries identify a constitutional tradition as an 
enterprise both real-an  issue  of decision,  action, and force-and  theo- 
rized-a  matter that must be justified or claimed legitimate and that is al- 
ways vulnerable to challenge. The two aspects are joined. A constitution- 
al project is, first, the making of a regime of relations that is tangible and 
concrete. It is the creation of a state, in the case I distinguish here, as dis- 
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tinctive as the culture or the ethos that seems sometimes more evocatively 
to mark an age. Second, a constitutional  enterprise  is the vetting of that  new 
and official collective.  It is the presentation of the regime just constructed 
as right and proper, as appropriate  for all its participants, and it is open to 
dispute on that ground by any of them. 
According to this approach, a constitutional tradition  is at once a project 
that is unremittingly institutional and an enterprise that is as profoundly 
ideological. It is precisely the pull of those two axes, the institutional and 
the ideological, that creates an angle or plane of constitutional experience 
distinct from that described by political or intellectual histories, by cultur- 
al studies, or by other richly textured accounts of change. Such a defini- 
tion requires that we reconsider the relationship  often assumed between the 
institutional and the ideological  coordinates. 
Institutional realities are the dynamics that define the public in daily 
practice. They are not structures  but actions, patterns  drawn in very human 
terms. Government itself is not a thing, but a concatenation of decisions, 
made, enforced, and contested,  about who should speak and with what 
authority. The mortal and changing character of institutions is often lost 
in existing accounts. And for every account that reifies institutional  dynam- 
ics, there is another that ignores them. But institutions conceived as mat- 
ters of everyday practice are the relationships that incarnate the state. 
So government resolved to the level  of experience is everywhere and 
each day constituted by practices that set apart  the identities and decisions 
of people. Certain members of the community become agents or officials, 
representatives acting at a particular  moment for the whole. Their role dis- 
tinguishes them from those whose identities become, by contrast, private. 
The figures now public gain a corresponding authority; it allows them to 
act by privileging their decisions as official, or as expressions of the col- 
lective. That status separates their determinations from the conclusions of 
those who are speaking solely for themselves. 
These divisions of role and authority are enormously effective.  Perva- 
sively, they change the way that people relate to each other: they activate 
a public and define participation in it, they shape decision making on mat- 
ters collective,  they determine the distribution of common resources, they 
mark the distance between members of a community. Day by day, differ- 
ences of identity and decision put the state into circulation; it is not a struc- 
ture but a mode of interaction. Hierarchy, in this dynamic world, is not 
architectural  but immanent, drawn in lines of personal authority and reit- 
erated in thousands of exchanges. 
The regime of relations created is, at the same time, always a claim. The 
distribution of official  agency and authority that realizes government is 
unavoidably a matter of ideology,  a political assertion. In a community 
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ture but a mode of interaction. Hierarchy, in this dynamic world, is not 
architectural  but immanent, drawn in lines of personal authority and reit- 
erated in thousands of exchanges. 
The regime of relations created is, at the same time, always a claim. The 
distribution of official  agency and authority that realizes government is 
unavoidably a matter of ideology,  a political assertion. In a community 
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to mark an age. Second, a constitutional  enterprise  is the vetting of that  new 
and official collective.  It is the presentation of the regime just constructed 
as right and proper, as appropriate  for all its participants, and it is open to 
dispute on that ground by any of them. 
According to this approach, a constitutional tradition  is at once a project 
that is unremittingly institutional and an enterprise that is as profoundly 
ideological. It is precisely the pull of those two axes, the institutional and 
the ideological, that creates an angle or plane of constitutional experience 
distinct from that described by political or intellectual histories, by cultur- 
al studies, or by other richly textured accounts of change. Such a defini- 
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authority. The mortal and changing character of institutions is often lost 
in existing accounts. And for every account that reifies institutional  dynam- 
ics, there is another that ignores them. But institutions conceived as mat- 
ters of everyday practice are the relationships that incarnate the state. 
So government resolved to the level  of experience is everywhere and 
each day constituted by practices that set apart  the identities and decisions 
of people. Certain members of the community become agents or officials, 
representatives acting at a particular  moment for the whole. Their role dis- 
tinguishes them from those whose identities become, by contrast, private. 
The figures now public gain a corresponding authority; it allows them to 
act by privileging their decisions as official, or as expressions of the col- 
lective. That status separates their determinations from the conclusions of 
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conceived as constitutional, those assuming the public role represent that 
they, as agents of the whole, are speaking and acting for the whole so that 
the order they effectuate is legitimate, not oppressive. 
Like the decisions that make the state, the discourse that legitimates it 
includes an aspect avowedly official. Justification  is necessary to claim the 
status  of right  authority.  That status  operates,  in turn,  to distinguish  the  justifi- 
cation that counts. The claims of public agents do not occur in a vacuum; 
they exist in tension with a multitude of responses. The assertions of offi- 
cials draw challenges from those defined as private by the current  regime, 
who would allocate collective agency and authority  in different ways. The 
struggle  extends outward;  the image of the state is made and unmade  in pow- 
erful sources that are eclectic, inclusive, and colloquial. But alternative or- 
ders conceived and left too far from the line of contention die quietly there. 
The exchange over the legitimacy of a constitutional tradition attends the 
daily assertion of authority;  it is pitched over the divide, inagurated  by that 
assertion and just as constantly contested, between public and private. 
A constitutional  history defined in this way focuses on governmental acts 
and the contest over their legitimacy. It locates as its subject the tradition  of 
practice and justification that a society creates when its members are pro- 
pelled by a promise of coherence between institutional realities (the divi- 
sions between people drawn actually) and ideological rationales (the justifi- 
cations  for those  divisions).  A  constitutional  regime  requires defining 
participation  in ways that allow a selective distribution  of authority  to be ac- 
cepted as beneficial to the whole or as "right,"  just, or natural.  The equilib- 
rium is elusive, but the effort to reach it forges a public community-as  well 
as marking off individuality-among  a group defined by the confluence of 
presence in history and geography. 
Writing constitutional history as the angle of experience formed when 
people order one another in the name of a larger public has clear implica- 
tions. Most obviously, it proposes that a constitutional project occurs only 
as ideological  claims are mediated through myriad acts, the practices es- 
tablishing the lines of the state. To participants, the constitution of com- 
munity exists as a claim made through various exchanges or, conversely, 
as practice of the public justified as such. 
The point that institutional practice and ideological justification inerad- 
icably inform one another  means that constitutional  traditions  develop there, 
at that juncture, a distinctly human location. They are not so elemental as 
to be a matter of chemistry, nor so transcendent as to be a matter solely of 
discourse. The old institutional histories may, in fact, have assumed the 
scientific model in their emphasis on institutional development: represen- 
tative structures,  popular roles, separation of powers seemed almost natu- 
ral components  of  some universalizable  democracy. A certain political 
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community would follow predictably from the right mix of elements. New-
er,  ideologically oriented histories adopt the discursive standard in their 
emphasis on conceptual categories-turns of the mind, contingent and 
contextual to be sure-that emanate from a collective and form a culture 
of ideas, the vocabulary of an open debate conducted in an arc across a 
thousand political pamphlets, the press, the pulpit, the academy, other po-
litical and private arenas. In this view, a constitutional tradition is the out-
come of a large political free-for-all, a contest of visions, interests, and 
arguments. 
These invocations strike too low or too high. A constitutional tradition 
is neither an effort so consistent in its components that it becomes a sci-
ence, nor so inflected that it escapes the mundane, the matter of the state, 
and becomes discourse or debate itself. Historians realized long ago that 
institutions were not basic elements, to be captured and combined in the 
right proportions, the ideological commitment to democracy like some 
constant medium. Institutions are changing arrangements, peculiar to an 
era and a community, affected at every moment by the shifting forces of 
ideologies themselves enormously complex. The commitment to constitu-
tionalism as a matter of discourse or debate among many participants has 
a harder hold on the historiography. It fits with the Realist grasp of multi-
plicity in political and moral commitment. It takes the "interpretivist turn," 
asserting that political, social, and economic contexts shape the very vo-
cabulary of the speakers who inhabit them. And it places those speakers 
within a state we recognize-the container for a pluralist clash of persons 
and ideas, interest groups, and agendas. The collective becomes the occa-
sion for a debate, in the end. 
It is the last step that understates the presence of institutional forces. 
Conceiving the state as an occasion for a debate accords with the modern 
theory of a liberal state. The state itself is, however, a set of practices that 
are neither generic nor so recessive. Institutional particularity penetrates 
every ideological principle. The meaning of ideological commitments de-
pends on how they are informed by a set of institutional assumptions. 
Concepts like "adjudication" and "legislation" are freighted with premises 
about the practices that compose them. The same is true about ideas of "due 
process" or "just compensation"; these notions change their very defini-
tion if they are tied implicitly to the courts, or if they are effectuated by 
other means of enforcement, like legislative determination. "Rights" them-
selves may be drawn on a judicial prototype, or they may be a reason for 
revolution. It is impossible to avoid issues of institutional practice; one can 
only leave them unexamined, much like the old histories left ideologies 
unproblematically assumed. 
More is at stake in the metaphor, however, than a decision about how to 
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to the approach  chosen. When constitutional  form seemed a matter  of chem- 
istry, change was a science. Figuring out how to identify the correct com- 
ponents and how to combine them became a process of trial and error,  and 
participants made progress toward an ever-more refined state. When con- 
stitutional form turned into a matter of debate, change became a function 
of the democratic market with its power and its shortcomings. Actors in 
such a market appear, a priori, as equal participants in the constitutional 
project. To be sure, they are situated in a context that creates grave inequi- 
ties: wealth, class, ethnicity, gender, and other divisions produce enormous 
barriers  to the free exchange of ideas and the constructive development of 
the community. Institutions transmit these differences, as do other legal 
arrangements.  There is nevertheless a common currency-there  are words 
and concepts that can be claimed by all, manipulated by many, traded a 
million times to build a world no one quite anticipated. So politics, in this 
view, remains comfortably open and uncertain:  combustions or slow trans- 
formations can occur across social and economic barriers.  People so ener- 
gized can act independently and in concert to assert a new constitutional 
course. 
If institutional  realities were inert ingredients when constitutional  change 
seemed a science, they are distinctly derivative products in the market  view 
of constitutional change. The state itself acts as a conduit that delivers re- 
sults or allows them. But that role renders it, ironically, almost transpar- 
ent. As struggles that seem to be located elsewhere-across  class, gender, 
or economic status-generate  the operative issues, the differentials of role 
and authority created by the state become  less  problematic. That result 
diverts inquiry into how the very practices and routines at issue in consti- 
tutional change-the  ways that people draw the state in their real actions- 
themselves affect the process of transformation. 
Constitutional change is neither a science nor a debate but a radically 
different enterprise. It is a matter of elaborating a field of human relations, 
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relationship with imperial officials unattainable elsewhere in the empire 
where the legitimacy and practical power of such agents exert more force. 
Indeed, it may be possible to reinvent public authority  on the margin, while 
others near the center can find no opening in the patterns of government 
that surround  them. And those who do succeed in reordering their consti- 
tutional worlds themselves rely on roles and authority selectively  distrib- 
uted. A vote, for example, may open opportunities  to some while constrict- 
ing the voice of many others to a single point. 
Under such circumstances, justification itself splinters. There is no as- 
surance that participants so variously located have agreed or accepted a 
regime, if those words assume a decision measured by neutral or uncondi- 
tioned means. Consensus is not a particularly  meaningful concept in such 
circumstances,  nor does  deliberation occur in common  or at the same 
moment. Instead, a constitutional project prevails as an attempted organi- 
zation of the public, proposed when the enterprise is already underway. 
Constitutional status becomes a movement of initiative and commitment, 
despair and default rather than a static matter of choice or consent. 
Histories no longer claim to be either exhaustive or self-contained; there 
turned out to be no discrete territories of human life that could be parsed 
and separately detailed. The scope of human circumstance in turn, how- 
ever, threatens  to overwhelm any account. The challenge is to write another 
sort of history altogether,  one that filters the past and fits it together through 
a particular definition rather than dividing and transmitting it as if trans- 
parently. A history should identify some aspect of human experience-a 
constitutional trajectory in this instance-without  rendering it either iso- 
lated from other aspects of life or indistinguishable from them. 
Locating constitutional change in the effort made by people to draw a 
state that they can justify does not isolate it. People act to create public and 
private  driven by concerns that  range from the ethical to the economic. They 
justify, receive, or respond to those divisions in the same world. Practice 
and legitimation thus depend dramatically on their context. The approach 
sketched above does, however, direct attention to a particular  trajectory  of 
experience. It locates the abstraction  of constitutional  discourse in the daily 
relations of people divided in the name of a collective. And by following 
institutional realities to their end, it throws into relief the tiered descent of 
authority. 
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